Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law

LARC @ Cardozo Law
Cardozo Law Review de•novo

Scholarship

2016

Enforcing Compliance with Constitutionally-Required Disclosures:
A Proposed Rule
Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Court for the District of Columbia

Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/de-novo
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sullivan, Emmet G., "Enforcing Compliance with Constitutionally-Required Disclosures: A Proposed Rule"
(2016). Cardozo Law Review de•novo. 44.
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/de-novo/44

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarship at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cardozo Law Review de•novo by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For
more information, please contact christine.george@yu.edu, ingrid.mattson@yu.edu.

SULLIVAN.2016 (Do Not Delete)

8/11/2016 5:42 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

de•novo

ENFORCING COMPLIANCE WITH
CONSTITUTIONALLY-REQUIRED DISCLOSURES: A
PROPOSED RULE
Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan †

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 138
I.

DISCLOSURE ABUSES IN UNITED STATES V. STEVENS ....................................... 140

II. EFFORTS TO AMEND FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16 TO
INCORPORATE THE REQUIREMENTS OF BRADY AND ITS PROGENY .................. 141
III. EFFORTS TO INCORPORATE THE REQUIREMENTS OF BRADY AND ITS
PROGENY/REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AT THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT LEVEL ................................................................. 147
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 149

INTRODUCTION
I am of the opinion that the rules of federal criminal procedure
should be amended to explicitly incorporate constitutionally-required
disclosures. Specifically, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16
governs discovery and inspection, but it does not incorporate the

† The Honorable Emmet G. Sullivan is a U.S. District Judge in the District Court for the
District of Columbia.
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requirements of Brady v. Maryland 1 and its progeny to require the
government to provide exculpatory and impeachment evidence to the
defendant. Although there have been efforts over the years to amend the
federal rules to affirmatively codify these constitutional disclosure
requirements, they have not been successful, in part due to resistance
from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). 2 Some of the ninety-four
district courts nationwide have taken action on their own and have
adopted local rules and/or standing orders setting forth the disclosure
requirements for prosecutors practicing before those courts. Further,
some judges issue standing Brady Orders for each criminal case on their
respective dockets.
There are many reasons to support this rule change. First and
foremost, greater compliance with the disclosure requirements would
result in fewer unlawful convictions and unlawful sentencings,
important aspects of overall reform in the criminal justice system. 3
Second, a single federal rule that affirmatively codifies the disclosure
requirements would be enforceable against non-compliant prosecutors.
Third, given that the overwhelming majority of criminal cases are
resolved by plea agreements, it is imperative that the government
interprets its constitutional obligation broadly and discloses exculpatory
evidence to defendants during plea negotiations. An explicit disclosure
requirement would ensure that the defendant’s waiver of the right to
trial is both knowing and voluntary. Fourth, although local disclosure
rules and standing orders are laudable, they create the opportunity for
inconsistency in federal prosecutions across the ninety-four districts
nationwide.
To provide a striking example of the need for a federal disclosure
rule, in Part I, I briefly summarize a report on the discovery abuses that
occurred in the case of United States v. Theodore F. Stevens. 4 In Part II,
I describe efforts beginning in 2003 to amend Rule 16. In Part III, I
provide an overview of the local district court disclosure rules and
standing orders nationwide. Part III also provides the proposed rule now
being considered for adoption by the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia.

1
2
3

373 U.S. 83 (1963).
See infra Part II.
Readers interested in criminal justice reform may wish to read an opinion I recently issued
in two cases where I was confronted with a request to approve deferred prosecution agreements
for corporate defendants. See United States v. Saena Tech Corp., No. 14-66 (EGS), 2015 WL
6406266 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2015); United States v. Intelligent Decisions, Inc., No. 14-211 (EGS),
2015 WL 6406266 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2015).
4 United States v. Stevens, No. 1:08-cr-00231 (EGS) (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2012).
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I. DISCLOSURE ABUSES IN UNITED STATES V. STEVENS
In 2008, Senator Theodore “Ted” Stevens (R-AK) was running for
re-election for his seventh term. 5 He was also a criminal defendant in a
case over which I was presiding. 6 After a four week trial, and about one
week prior to election day, a jury found Senator Stevens guilty of lying
on Senate disclosure forms. 7 He lost the election, a Democrat replaced
him, and the balance of power shifted in the Senate. 8 This consequential
chain of events may well have turned out differently had the
government followed the law because during the course of post-trial
proceedings, it became clear that the Stevens prosecution was permeated
by systematic concealment of evidence favorable to the Senator in
violation of the law, the Constitution, and the prosecutors’ ethical
duties.
About six months after the verdict was returned, then-Attorney
General Eric H. Holder, Jr. moved to dismiss the indictment against
Senator Stevens with prejudice. 9 As it appeared to me that prosecutorial
misconduct had tainted the proceedings in my courtroom, where I have
sworn, for over thirty years on the bench, that every defendant will
receive a fair trial, I appointed a highly regarded lawyer and former
Assistant United States Attorney, Henry F. Schuelke, III, to investigate
what went wrong in the investigation and prosecution of the Stevens
case, and to recommend whether there was a basis to prosecute the
prosecutors for criminal contempt of court. 10
After an investigation of nearly three years, during which both
Senator Stevens and one of the attorneys who prosecuted him died, and
following extensive collateral proceedings, Mr. Schuelke’s report was
made public. Based on his exhaustive investigation, Mr. Schuelke and
his colleague William Shields concluded that “[t]he investigation and
prosecution of U.S. Senator Ted Stevens were permeated by the
systematic concealment of significant exculpatory evidence which
would have independently corroborated [his] defense and his testimony,
and seriously damaged the testimony and credibility of the
government’s key witness.” 11 Mr. Schuelke further found that at least
5 See, e.g., Adam Clymer, Ted Stevens, Longtime Alaska Senator, Dies at 86, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/11/us/politics/11stevens.html?_r=0. At the
time of his death in 2010, Senator Stevens (R-AK) had been the longest-serving Republican
senator in history. Id.
6 See Stevens, No. 1:08-cr-00231 (EGS) (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2012).
7 Clymer, supra note 5.
8 Id.
9 I granted that motion. Order, Stevens, No. 1:08-cr-00231 (EGS), 2009 WL 6525926
(D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009).
10 Order, Stevens, No. 1:08-cr-00231 (EGS) (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2009).
11 Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan of Investigation Conducted Pursuant to the Court’s
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some of the concealment was willful and intentional, and related to
many of the issues raised by the defense during the course of the
Stevens trial. 12
Despite his findings of significant, widespread, and, at times,
intentional misconduct, Mr. Schuelke did not, however, recommend
prosecution for criminal contempt. This was because he found that the
court had not issued an order specifically instructing prosecutors to
obey the law by turning over any exculpatory evidence. Noting that,
“[i]t should go without saying that neither Judge Sullivan, nor any
District Judge, should have to order the Government to comply with its
constitutional obligations, let alone that he should feel compelled to
craft such an order with a view toward a criminal contempt prosecution,
anticipating its willful violation,” Mr. Schuelke nevertheless
recommended that, without disobedience of a “clear and unequivocal”
order, the prosecutors not be charged with criminal contempt. 13
As a result of the Stevens trial and its aftermath, I suggested that an
amendment to Rule 16 be revisited to require the government to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense, as set forth in Brady and
its progeny. I have also suggested that certain changes to the local rules
of the District Court for the District of Columbia would ensure that the
government is fully aware of its disclosure obligations. Finally, I now
issue a standing Brady Order in each criminal case on my docket, which
I update as the law in the area progresses. I discuss each of these efforts
below.
II. EFFORTS TO AMEND FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16 TO
INCORPORATE THE REQUIREMENTS OF BRADY AND ITS PROGENY
There have been concerted efforts to amend the federal rules to
incorporate Brady’s disclosure requirements, but to date they have not
resulted in an amendment to Rule 16. 14 The Judicial Conference of the
United States’ Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure
(Advisory Committee or Committee) first began considering an
amendment to Rule 16 that would “require the government to disclose
exculpatory and impeaching evidence 14 days before trial” based on a

Order, dated April 7, 2009, In re Special Proceedings, Misc. No. 09-0198 (1:08-cr-00231 (EGS)),
ECF No. 435 at 1 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2012).
12 See generally id.
13 Id. at 513.
14 The federal judiciary is authorized to set forth the rules of practice, procedure, and
evidence for the federal courts, subject to Congressional rejection, modification, or deferral of
those rules. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077. A detailed description of this
rulemaking process is available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemakingprocess/how-rulemaking-process-works/overview-bench-bar-and-public.
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proposal submitted to the Committee by the American College of Trial
Lawyers in 2003. 15 Although DOJ opposed the amendment, the
Advisory Committee voted at its April 2005 meeting in favor of
amending the rule. 16 The Committee and its Rule 16 Subcommittee
worked on the language of the amendment to address concerns
expressed by DOJ, with the intention of taking final action on the
proposal in April 2006. 17
At the April 2006 meeting, DOJ presented to the Committee
proposed revisions to the United States Attorneys’ Manual (USAM),
which it offered as an alternative to amending Rule 16. 18 DOJ stated
“that the revision of the Manual would promote prosecutorial
uniformity and regularity nationwide, would allow for early disclosure
of exculpatory and impeaching evidence, and would encourage
prosecutors in most cases to exceed the disclosure requirements
mandated by” Brady and Giglio. 19 One Committee member expressed
concern about whether the proposed revisions would require disclosures
regardless
of
materiality
and
DOJ
responded
that
“prosecutors . . . would be encouraged to construe materiality
broadly.” 20 Another member expressed concern that without the rule
amendment, “conflicting local rules would emerge.” 21 As the revisions
to the manual were presented as an alternative to the rule change, DOJ
informed the Committee that it “would vigorously oppose the proposed
Rule 16 amendment at the Standing Committee and beyond, if
necessary.” 22 Committee members who were “proponents of a rules
change noted that the provisions of the USAM are not judicially
enforceable, and they also stressed the importance of having a judge,
rather than a prosecutor, determine whether disclosure of exculpatory or
impeaching material is warranted in a given case.” 23 In the end, the
Committee, by a vote of seven to six, voted to table, until September
2006, consideration of the proposed amendment in light of DOJ’s
15 HON. SUSAN C. BUCKLEW, ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES 7 (Dec. 8, 2005), http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-rules-criminalprocedure-december-2005.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MINUTES 9–11 (Apr. 3–4, 2006), http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/advisory-committee-rules-criminalprocedure-april-2006.
19 Id. at 9.
20 Id. at 9–10.
21 Id. at 10.
22 Id.
23 HON. SUSAN C. BUCKLEW, ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES 14 (May 20, 2006), http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-rules-criminalprocedure-may-2006.
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proposed revisions to the USAM. 24
In September 2006, the Advisory Committee met in a special
session to discuss DOJ’s proposed revisions to the USAM and to
determine whether, in light of those revisions, it should nonetheless
forward the draft Rule 16 amendment to the Standing Committee. 25 At
that meeting, DOJ reported that it had made improvements to the
USAM provisions since the April 2006 Committee meeting. 26 DOJ
explained that the policy, which was at that point fully approved,
exceeded the disclosure requirements of Brady and Giglio, required
supervisory approval to delay disclosure of impeachment or exculpatory
information, and clarified that the policy applied to sentencing and the
guilt-innocence phases of a case. 27 In contrast to its position at the April
2006 meeting, DOJ stated that the USAM revisions would go into effect
even if the Committee voted to forward the draft Rule 16 amendment to
the Standing Committee. 28
Although the Committee was appreciative of the improvements
that DOJ made to the USAM provisions, it was concerned about: (1) the
discretion given to the prosecutor to determine whether impeachment
material is “significant” or “substantial”; (2) the fact that the policy only
applied to prosecutors; and (3) the lack of judicial enforceability of the
policy. 29 In the end, the Committee voted eight to four to approve the
Rule 16 amendment and forward it to the Standing Committee. 30 The
proposed amendment created a new subsection requiring the
government to provide exculpatory or impeaching information, without
imposing the requirement under Brady that the information be material
to the defendant’s guilt or punishment. 31
The Standing Committee considered the proposed rule amendment
at its June 2007 meeting. 32 Members the Advisory Committee presented
24
25

Id.
ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MINUTES 1 (Sept. 5, 2006), http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/advisory-committee-rules-criminalprocedure-september-2006.
26 Id. at 2.
27 Id.
28 Id. See also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL §§ 9-5.001, 9-5.100
(2016) (noting the policy regarding disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment information, and
disclosure to prosecutors of potential impeachment information concerning law enforcement
agency witnesses, respectively).
29 HON. SUSAN C. BUCKLEW, ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES 5 (Dec. 18, 2006), http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-rules-criminalprocedure-december-2006.
30 Id.
31 The proposed amendment and commentary are provided at Appendix 1.
32 See generally COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, MINUTES 31–40 (June
11–12, 2007), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/committee-rulespractice-and-procedure-june-2007. At this juncture, the role of the Standing Committee is to
determine whether the proposed rule should be published for comment.
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the proposed amendment as the culmination of four years of intensive
study by the Committee, including a survey of all relevant local rules
and standing orders in the district courts nationwide. 33 Advisory
Committee members had also reviewed case law addressing Brady
issues, relevant articles, the American Bar Association’s model rules,
and correspondence from federal defenders. 34 With regard to the
changes made to the USAM elaborating on the government’s disclosure
obligations, the Advisory Committee determined that changes to the
manual could not take the place of a rule change because: (1) “as a
practical matter, the committee would have no way to monitor the
practical operation of the changes or even to know about problems that
might arise in individual cases[;]” and (2) the manual would not be
judicially enforceable. 35
DOJ expressed its opposition to the proposed amendment to the
Standing Committee. It argued that the proposal: (1) “goes well beyond
what is required by the Constitution and federal statutes”; (2) conflicts
with the rights of victims and would cause insecurity among witnesses;
(3) was inconsistent with current federal discovery procedures; and (4)
“would inevitably generate a substantial amount of litigation on such
matters as whether exculpatory or impeachment information is
‘material.’” 36 DOJ suggested that the Standing Committee wait to see
how the revisions to the USAM worked, or in the alternative the rule
should be referred back to the Advisory Committee to address the issues
outlined by DOJ. 37
The Standing Committee declined to approve the publication of the
proposed amendment “with the understanding that the advisory
committee will be free to study the topic matter further and take such
further action as it deems appropriate at some future date.” 38 The
Standing Committee was concerned that the proposed amendment was
too broad and believed it best to wait to see how the revisions to the
USAM addressed the issues. 39
I thought the appropriate time for “further action” was in April
2009—after the Stevens case had been dismissed, and after the USAM
revisions had been in place for a period of time—and I urged the
Advisory Committee to again consider proposing the 2007 amendment
to Rule 16. In my letter to Judge Richard C. Tallman, then-Chair of the
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 39.
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
29 (September 2007), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/reportsjudicial-conference-september-2007.
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Advisory Committee, I argued that the compelling reasons for eight of
the twelve members of the Rules Committee to support the proposed
rule amendment in 2006 were no less compelling in 2009 after the
Stevens trial and I walked him through the litany of problems in that
trial that we were aware of at that time. 40
It was fortuitous that the Supreme Court issued its decision in Cone
v. Bell, 41 on the day I sent my letter to Judge Tallman, giving me the
opportunity to rely on that decision in which the Supreme Court
reiterated the principles articulated in Brady and the Strickler v.
Greene, 42 Kyles v. Whitley, 43 and United States v. Bagley 44 decisions.
Although the Cone Court observed that the prudent prosecutor will err
on the side of transparency, resolving doubtful questions in favor of
disclosure, 45 I suggested to Judge Tallman that a federal rule of criminal
procedure requiring all exculpatory evidence to be produced to the
defense in a timely manner and in a useable format would eliminate the
need to rely on a “prudent prosecutor” deciding to “err of the side of
transparency,” and would go a long way towards furthering the search
for the truth in criminal trials and ensuring that justice is done. 46 In
response, Judge Tallman appointed a subcommittee to reconsider the
amendment to Rule 16. 47
At the same time that the subcommittee was reconsidering the
amendments, and in the aftermath of the Stevens trial, DOJ launched a
number of initiatives aimed at improving the compliance of federal
prosecutors with their discovery obligations. These initiatives included:
(1) appointing a working group on discovery issues; (2) conducting
annual mandatory prosecutor training on discovery; (3) requiring each
district to designate a discovery expert to advise prosecutors; and (4)
creating a new position in Washington, DC to oversee these efforts. 48
DOJ told the Committee that it would not oppose amending Rule
16 to codify the disclosure requirements of Brady, but that it would
object to any proposed amendment that went beyond Brady. 49 My
response to DOJ’s efforts was two-fold. First, while the steps it was
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

See Appendix 2.
556 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2009).
527 U.S. 263 (1999).
514 U.S. 419 (1995).
473 U.S. 667 (1985).
Cone, 556 U.S. at 470 n. 15.
Appendix 2 at 4.
ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MINUTES 5 (Oct. 13, 2009), http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/advisory-committee-rules-criminalprocedure-october-2009.
48 HON. RICHARD C. TALLMAN, ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES 2 (Dec. 11, 2009),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-rulescriminal-procedure-december-2009.
49 Id.

SULLIVAN.2016 (Do Not Delete)

146

C A R D O Z O LA W R E V I E W D E • N O V O

8/11/2016 5:42 PM

[2016

taking were laudable, efforts it took such as revising the USAM are not
enforceable and could be weakened or discarded when an Attorney
General with a different agenda is appointed by a successive President.
Second, the government should not be able to unilaterally make the
decision of what constitutes material information to be turned over to
the defendant, and a Rule 16 amendment would change that.
Over a period of two years, the subcommittee held consultative
sessions with judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, academics, agency
counsel, and crime victims’ representatives. 50 It also worked with the
Federal Judicial Center to prepare a nationwide survey of judges,
prosecutors, and the defense bar, which collected views on issues,
problems, or concerns surrounding pretrial discovery and disclosure.51
Fifty-one percent of the judges responding to the survey favored
amending Rule 16. 52
Despite these efforts, in April 2011, the Advisory Committee voted
six to five not to move forward with an amendment. 53 The Committee
cited the following reasons for its decision. First, the results of the FJC
survey reflected a lack of consensus throughout the judiciary as to
whether an amendment was needed. 54 Second, while the Committee
was impressed with the institutional structural changes in policies,
procedures, and training implemented by DOJ since the Stevens case, it
was not convinced that a rule change was needed to ensure that those
changes would continue in subsequent administrations. 55 Finally, the
Committee stated that it “was not convinced that the problem is so
severe as to warrant a rule change when existing Supreme Court
authority on a prosecutor’s disclosure obligations is clear and for which
substantial sanctions are available for non-compliance.” 56 While the
Advisory Committee’s consideration of amendments to Rule 16 did not
result in a proposed amendment at that time, it did influence a new
section in the 2013 edition of the FJC’s Bench Book covering Brady
50 See, e.g., HON. RICHARD C. TALLMAN, ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES 34 (May 19, 2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-rulescriminal-procedure-may-2010.
51 Id. at 35.
52 ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MINUTES 12 (Apr. 11–12, 2011), http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/advisory-committee-rules-criminalprocedure-april-2011 [hereinafter April 2011 MINUTES].
53 HON. RICHARD C. TALLMAN, ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE CRIMINAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE 10 (May 12, 2011), http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-rules-criminalprocedure-may-2011 [hereinafter May 2011 REPORT].
54 Id. Although 51 percent of the judges responding to the survey favored amending Rule 16,
60 percent said that they were not aware of any Brady violations within the past five years. April
2011 MINUTES, supra note 52, at 14.
55 May 2011 REPORT, supra note 53, at 10.
56 Id.
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and Giglio obligations, which provides a wealth of relevant information
for judges. 57 My colleague Judge Paul Friedman took the lead in
drafting this section of the Benchbook. 58
Although efforts to amend Rule 16 have not been successful thus
far, it is my firm belief that the Advisory Committee will revisit this
issue and that a proposed amendment will at the very least be published
for public comment. In recent years, public dialogue has begun to focus
on ways in which the criminal justice system can be reformed to reduce
over-incarceration of individuals for non-violent crimes, especially drug
crimes. Codifying these constitutional disclosure requirements,
particularly in view of the high percentage of criminal cases that result
in guilty pleas, 59 is a critical aspect of criminal justice reform. I submit
that it is difficult to see how a criminal defendant could knowingly and
voluntarily waive his or her constitutional right to trial without being
made aware of exculpatory evidence in the government’s possession.
III. EFFORTS TO INCORPORATE THE REQUIREMENTS OF BRADY AND ITS
PROGENY/REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AT THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT LEVEL
In addition to efforts to codify the requirements of Brady and its
progeny at the national level, some district courts have adopted local
rules and/or standing orders that address the government’s duty to
disclose. Approximately twenty-eight of the ninety-four federal district
courts nationwide have promulgated rules regarding the disclosure
obligations of prosecutors who appear in those courts, 60 and eight more
districts have issued standing orders governing those obligations.61
57 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES § 5.06 (6th ed.
2013), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Benchbook-US-District-Judges-6TH-FJC-MAR2013-Public.pdf/$file/Benchbook-US-District-Judges-6TH-FJC-MAR-2013-Public.pdf.
58 Id. at iv.
59 MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2012 STATISTICAL TABLES 2 (2015).
60 See, e.g., SD ALA LR 16; N.D. Cal. Crim. L.R. 16-1, 17-1; N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 26.2; S.D.
Fla. L.R. 88.10; LCrR 16.1, NDGa; S.D. Ga. LCrR 16.1; D. Haw. CrimLR 16.1; CDIL-LR 16.1;
N.D. Ill. LCrR. 16.1; D.N. Mar. I. LCrR 17.1.1; LR, D. Mass 116.1, 116.2; D. Minn. LR 12.1(a);
D. Mont. L.R. CR 16.1; D.N.H. LCrR 16.1; D.N.M.LR-Cr. 16.1, 16.2; N.D.N.Y. L. R. Cr. P.
14.1; E.D.N.C. Local Criminal Rule 16.1; M.D.N.C. LCrR 16.1; E.D. Okla. LCrR 16.1; W.D.
Okla. LCrR 16.1; W.D. Pa. LCrR 16; M.D. Tenn. LCrR 16.01; Western District of Texas Rule
16; D. Vt. L.Cr. R. 16; Local Rules W.D. Wash. CrR 16; N.D. W. Va. LR Cr P 16.05, 16.06; S.D.
W. Va. LR CR P 16.1; E.D. Wis. Crim. R. 16.
61 See, e.g., Standing Order on Criminal Discovery, Cr. Misc. No. 534 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 4,
1999); Standing Order on Discovery, L. Cr. R. App. 145 (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 2009); In re Revised
Criminal Procedure Order, Gen. Order No. 242 (D. Idaho Mar. 1, 2010); General Order of
Discovery and Scheduling (D. Kan. June 12, 2012); In re Standing Order for Discovery and
Inspection and Fixing Motion Cut-Off Date in Criminal Cases, Admin. Order No. 03-AO-027
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2003); Standing Order Regarding Discovery in Criminal Cases, Admin.
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These local rules vary in their scope and amount of detail. The U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts has promulgated one of
the broadest rules for disclosure of exculpatory information. 62
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, at the request
of Judge Friedman and myself, convened an ad hoc committee of
judges, prosecutors, and members of the defense bar, which spent the
past year drafting a proposed disclosure rule. The proposed rule
provides as follows:
(a) Unless the parties otherwise agree, the government shall make
available to the defense any non-trivial information known to the
government that tends to negate the defendant’s guilt, mitigate the
charged offense(s), or reduce the potential penalty. This requirement
applies regardless of whether the information would itself constitute
admissible evidence. The information, furthermore, shall be
produced, where not prohibited by law, in a readily usable form
unless that is impracticable; in such a circumstance, it shall be made
available to the defense for inspection and copying.
The government shall make good-faith efforts to promptly disclose
the information to the defense beginning at the defendant’s initial
appearance before the court, and this obligation shall remain ongoing
throughout the criminal proceeding.
(b) The information to be disclosed includes, but is not limited to:
(1) Information that is inconsistent with or tends to negate the
defendant’s guilt as to any element, including identification, of
the offense(s) with which the defendant is charged;
(2) Information that tends to establish an articulated and legally
cognizable defense theory or recognized affirmative defense to
the offense(s) with which the defendant is charged;
(3) Information that casts doubt on the credibility or accuracy of
any evidence, including witness testimony, the government
anticipates using in its case-in-chief at trial; and
(4) Impeachment information, which includes: (i) information
regarding whether any promise, reward, or inducement has been
given by the government to any witness it anticipates calling in
its case-in-chief; and (ii) information that identifies all pending
criminal cases against, and all criminal convictions of, any such
witness.
(c) As impeachment information described in (b)(4) is dependent on
which witnesses the government intends to call at trial, this rule does
Order No. 06-085 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2006); In re Criminal Trial Scheduling and Discovery,
Standing Order No. 15-2 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 2015); In re Criminal Discovery, Standing Order No.
2015-5 (D. Or. Mar. 16, 2015).
62 LR, D. Mass 116.2, http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/general/pdf/LC/2015%20LOCAL%
20RULES.pdf.
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not require the government to disclose such information before a trial
date is set.
(d) In the event the government believes that a disclosure under this
rule would compromise witness safety, national security, a sensitive
law-enforcement technique, or any other substantial government
interest, it may apply to the Court for a modification of the
requirements of this rule.
(e) For purposes of this rule, the government includes federal, state,
and local law-enforcement officers and other government officials
participating in the investigation and prosecution of the offense(s)
with which the defendant is charged. The government has an
obligation to seek from these sources all information subject to
disclosure under this Rule.
(f) The Court may set specific timelines for disclosure of any
information mentioned in this rule.

Pursuant to our local rules, the court provided notice of the
proposed local rule change and solicited comments, which were due no
later than March 28, 2016. The ad hoc committee and the court will
consider the comments received, and the court will ultimately vote on
whether to adopt the rule.
In addition to local court rules and standing orders, individual
judges may issue standing orders in the cases before them. Following
the Stevens case, I have issued a standing Brady Order for each criminal
case on my docket, updating it in reaction to developments in the law.63
For example, I recently revised my standing order to explicitly require
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence during plea negotiations. 64
CONCLUSION
In advocating against any rule modification, the government argues
that the number of cases involving discovery abuse is so small that no
need exists to amend Rule 16. I acknowledge that the vast majority of
prosecutors are dedicated honorable public servants. Nevertheless, the
need for a rule change should not be determined by the small number of
cases that demonstrate discovery abuse—and after people are caught

63
64

My standing Brady order is provided at Appendix 3.
Federal circuits are split on whether Brady and its progeny require the government to
disclose exculpatory evidence during the plea bargaining stage, and the question has not been
addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. That said,
one of my colleagues on the District Court here in the District of Columbia, in 2013, allowed a
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea because the prosecution had suppressed exculpatory
evidence before the defendant pled guilty. United States v. Nelson, 979 F. Supp. 2d 123, 135–36
(D.D.C. 2013).
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abusing the process. Rather, a rule change would: (1) help to avoid
unlawful convictions and unlawful sentencings; (2) be judicially
enforceable; (3) help to ensure that a defendant’s waiver of the right to
trial is both knowing and voluntary; and (4) bring more consistency to
compliance with disclosure obligations in federal prosecutions
nationwide.

